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The price of medicines is one of the main barriers to treatment access
for many poor people in developing countries due to their low purchasing
power and the limited availability of public or private insurance in poor
countries. It has been estimated that between fifty percent and ninety
percent of pharmaceutical expenditures in developing countries are paid
for out-of-pocket.' In developed countries, on the other hand, over seventy
percent of such expenditures are funded through insurance or other
reimbursement schemes.2
Patents and other mechanisms of market exclusivity facilitate the
acutely problematic pricing of new drugs: Intellectual property rights
(IPR) and regulatory protections grant a temporary monopoly to a right-
holder, thereby allowing prices to be set well above marginal and direct
manufacturing costs.3 Although the majority of essential drugs-as defined
by the World Health Organization's essential drug list4-are off-patent,
* Former senior Health Economist (Pharmaceuticals), World Bank. I would like to
acknowledge the useful comments made to the first version of the paper by Yolanda Tayler
(The World Bank), Nuria Homedes (University of Texas), and Rudolf V. Van Puymbroeck
(The World Bank). The responsibility for the final text and any possible errors remains
exclusively mine.
1. Jonathan Quick et al., Twenty-five Years of Essential Medicines, 80 BULL. WORLD HEALTH
ORG. 913, 914 (2002), available at
http://www.who.int/medicines/organization/par/cd-25th-anniversary/whobull.pdf.
2. Id.
3. This correspondingly encourages private investment in pharmaceutical research
and development (R&D).
4. WORLD HEALTH ORG., 13TH WHO MODEL LIST OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES (2003),
available at http://mednet3.who.int/eml (last visited Apr. 29, 2004).
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there are some important and even life-saving drugs (such as those for
H1V/AIDS and cancer) and vaccines that are patent-protected.
In recent years, research intensive industries and the developed
countries in which they are located have made a strong push for
international IPR harmonization. Harmonization of IPR amounts to
pressures for developing 'countries to raise their IPR protection to
developed-country levels. This trend has taken place in the last decade in
the multilateral context of the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. In
recent years, developed countries have also pushed to increase patent
protection beyond the levels required by TRIPS-known as "TRIPS-plus"
provisions-when negotiating bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs).5
This Case Study offers an insider's analysis of the role played by the
World Bank in affecting the affordability and accessibility of drugs in
developing countries in the current IPR environment. After exploring the
relationship between current trade agreements, international IPR, and
access to medicines, the Case Study describes the lending activities of the
Bank in the pharmaceutical area and argues that the type and amount of
funding that developing countries obtain from the Bank is unlikely to
significantly address problems of inadequate financing for pharmaceutical
purchases. However, the conditions set by the Bank for countries to
procure pharmaceuticals using the Bank's funds might have positive effects
on competition that could extend beyond Bank-funded purchases and
increase, in the long run, the efficiency of pharmaceutical expenditures. 6
This Case Study analyzes the position recently adopted by the Bank
regarding IPR and the procurement of AIDS pharmaceuticals and other
medical goods; the Bank seeks to encourage countries to use the
flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement and in their own legislation to
5. See, e.g., DAVID VIvAS-EUGUI, QUAKER UNITED NATIONS OFFICE, REGIONAL AND




6. Note, however, that while the problems posed by high drug prices can often be
mediated by pro-competitive interventions, this approach may not suffice to make drugs
affordable to the poorest populations under all circumstances. See, e.g., MOHGA K. SMITH,
GENERIC COMPETITION, PRICE AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES: THE CASE OF ANTIRETROVIRALS IN
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obtain the best available prices for products of guaranteed quality.
I. ACCESS TO MEDICINES: TRIPS AND BEYOND
Many proponents of free trade agreements have claimed that the
liberalization of trade improves the well-being of the participating
countries by removing trade barriers, enlarging potential markets and,
ultimately, allowing countries to increase their exports of goods for which
they have a comparative advantage. Under this argument, both developed
and developing countries benefit from increased trade.7 Throughout the
1990s, intellectual property provisions were progressively included in trade
agreements under this logic. The supporters of strong property rights
claimed that strong IPR would not only benefit developed countries and
the innovative pharmaceutical industry, which is highly concentrated in a
handful of developed countries, but would also have a favorable impact on
developing countries. Strong IPR, it was argued, makes new products
quickly available, generates foreign investment in developing countries,
and provides incentives for R&D into new therapies.8
Negotiated during the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round of the WTO and
signed in 1994, the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) Agreement has been the primary focus of attention in the debate
over IPR and access to medicines. However, IPR issues are also relevant to
other multilateral and bilateral trade agreements. Overall, TRIPS and the
IPR provisions of FTAs have received tremendous support from developed
countries as a result of pressure from their industries, but have received
mixed responses from developing country ministers.)
The debate over the effects of IPR in general and on pharmaceuticals
in particular is far from closed. But there is certainly much concern among
developing countries and activists about the negative effects that IPR might
have on prices and, correspondingly, the affordability and accessibility of
drugs.0 While the World Bank has expressed its concerns about the effects
7. See, e.g., Robert B. Zoellick, Trade Helps Afficans Help Themselves, WALL ST.J., May 23,
2001, at A26.
8. See, e.g., Roger Bate, The Worst Pandemic Looks To Get Worse, TECH. CENTRAL STATION,
Feb. 20, 2004, at http://www.aei.org/news/newslD. 1994,filter./news detail.asp.
9. See PETER DRAHos & RUTH MAYNE, GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT (2002).
10. See, e.g., ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES CAMPAIGN, TESTIMONY OF DOCTORS WITHOUT
BORDERS/MDECINS SANs FRONTIERtS (MSF) AT THE PUBLIC HEARING CONCERNING MARKET
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of IPRs on medicine pricing, there is little literature from the Bank on
FTAs and practically no comment on the effects of IPR clauses included in
FTAs.1
A potential balance between the demands of industry in the developed
world and the interests of developing countries seemed to arrive with the
2001 signing of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, which has
been discussed extensively elsewhere." The Declaration was unanimously
signed by WTO delegates and stated "that the TRIPS Agreement does not
and should not prevent members from taking measures to protect public
health.' 3 But some developed countries, especially the United States;
seemed to consider the Doha Declaration an unsatisfactory solution for their
own interests; as a result, they have attempted to move the cause of strong
IPR to other fora, such as bilateral and regional FFAs."4 Advocates for
developing countries state that developing country trade ministers should
refrain from signing trade agreements with "TRIPS-plus" provisions. 5
One could argue that developing countries are not obliged to sign
trade agreements unless they expect the benefits to outweigh the
corresponding costs. But the impact of any given trade agreement is far
from predictable. Whatever the specific outcomes, benefits are also.likely
to accrue for relatively wealthy population groups, while costs such as those
associated with a lower accessibility to drugs are likely to affect the most
vulnerable population groups.' 6
An estimation of the cost of various clauses of an FTA is not an easy
task. Estimating the static effects alone requires a large amount of
ACCESS IN THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS NEGOTIATIONS OF THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Sept. 9, 2002).
11. See Mamphela Ramphele & Nicholas Stern, Generic Drugs Can Make the Money Last,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2003, at A19.
12. See, e.g., Fred M. Abbott, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at the WTO, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 469, 469-505 (2002).
13. World Trade Org., Doha WTO Ministerial 2001, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist-e/minl_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm.
14. See generally ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES CAMPAIGN, DOHA DERAILED: A PROGRESS
REPORT ON TRIPS AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 4 (2003), available at http://www.accessmed-
msf.org/documents/cancunbriefing.pdf.
15. See, e.g.,JENNIFER BRANT, ROBBING THE POOR To PAY THE RICH? HOW THE UNITED
STATES KEEPS MEDICINES FROM THE WORLD'S POOREST 31 (Oxfam Briefing Paper No. 56, Nov.
2003), available at http://www.oxfam.org/eng/pdfs/pp031201_robbing-medicines-US.pdf.
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information concerning demand elasticities, defining a counterfactual,
and making risky assumptions on the evolution of the market conditions.
Moreover, it is far from clear that welfare economics provides the
appropriate tools for assessing the social cost and benefits of patent
protection and the resulting variations in drug prices and consumption.
For instance, the consumer surplus, a conventional measure of benefit in
welfare economics, might not be an acceptable measure of the value of a
lifesaving drug for an indigent person. It is probably safe to conclude that
it would be quite difficult to agree on any scientific or objective procedure
that allows us to measure the effects of an IPR regime in a conclusive way.
While it is clear that it will be difficult for developing countries to
estimate the costs to their domestic welfare, developed countries must
confront an ethical issue: To what extent should a developed country take
advantage of the economic and political needs and weaknesses of
developing countries in order to obtain some trade advantages likely to
result in reduced survival and increased distress for poor countries
populations? Even assuming a purely selfish approach, one might wonder
whether the intangible negative effects of signing such agreements-such
as anger and resentment toward developed countries-will ultimately
outweigh the economic advantages attained.
A more probing question concerns the long-term evolution of access
to drugs and pharmaceutical innovation-whether the present system of
pharmaceutical R&D and innovation is an acceptable and efficient one,
satisfying the needs and demands of both developed and developing
countries. The system is currently based on patents and other exclusive
marketing rights as the key incentive for private investment in drug
development. Private firms are expected to make an investment that they
expect later to recover in the form of extraordinary, monopoly profits. The
possible negative effects of such a system are significant: reduced
accessibility to the drugs among poor countries and population groups,
obstacles to research by other parties in areas protected by patents, and the
like. The key problem probably derives from the fact that the patent system
leads R&D toward profitable diseases and conditions, rather than toward
diseases that cause the most morbidity and mortality. 17 This explains the
obstacles to creating drugs for neglected diseases, as well as the (probably
excessive) research on highly-profitable "me-too" drugs that make a small
17. Press Release, Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative: Teaming Up To Address
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or negligible contribution to therapeutic innovation. 8
The options proposed as alternatives to the patent system are
manifold. They are mostly based on the separation of R&D and the
innovation market from drug manufacturing processes.' 9 The funding of
drug development in this manner would require public funding and
private donations. Taking into account the global public good that most
therapeutic innovation promotes, the issue should probably be addressed
at a multilateral level, perhaps through an international treaty establishing
how member countries should pay for the R&D and then have access to
the innovation.
Under this hypothetical scheme, once the priorities for R&D are
established by the members of the treaty, the funding should be allocated
in some competitive way among potential research organizations. The
funding could take the form of grants, allocated before the R&D activity is
carried out, or prizes awarded to the innovations a posteriori. Under any
scenario, the manufacturing sector would work under generic
competition. Any manufacturer would be allowed to produce the final
products free of any charge or for a fixed compensation.°
Such a scheme might sound utopian, and it would indeed be unwise to
assume that the present patent system could be radically changed in the
near future. The likely opposition of the research industry to such changes
and the difficulties in raising the funds for an alternative system are
formidable. But various proposals might well be tested as pilot experiences
for specific drugs. Essential drugs for neglected diseases seem a clear
category to start with: They are not adequately researched, anyway;
therefore, a failed experience would not have a negative impact on drug
availability.
II. THE WORLD BANK'S FINANCING OF MEDICINE PURCHASES
Within the context established in the previous Part, this Case Study
18. See ROBERT YOUNG& MICHAEL SURRUSCO, Rx R&D MYTHS: THE CASE AGAINST THE
DRUG INDUSTRY'S R&D "SCARE CARD" 13 (2001), available at
http://www.citizen.org/congress/campaign/special-interest/articles.cfm?ID=6538.
19. SeeJAMES LOVE, FROM TRIPS TO RIPS: A BETTER TRADE FRAMEWORK To SUPPORT
INNOVATION IN MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES (May 2003) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.cptech.org/slides/trips2rips.doc (last visited Apr. 29, 2004); see alsoJEAN
LANJOuw, A PATENT POLICY PROPOSAL FOR GLOBAL DISEASES (Brookings Policy Brief No. 84,
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aims to demonstrate the World Bank's effect on various factors relating
IPRs to medicine access. The World Bank has been lending funds for the
purchase of medicines through its Health, Nutrition and Population
(HNP) sector since the late 1970s. The World Bank's first project to
include pharmaceutical financing was called the Peru Health project and
was granted in 1983. Between 1983 and 1999, 116 Bank projects
incorporated a pharmaceutical component.2' Four types of pharmaceutical
purchases were provided with funding: (1) those for HNP projects that
financed drug procurement for specific diseases; (2) those for
pharmaceutical stand-alone projects; (3) those employing pharmaceutical
components as part of broader health reform projects; and (4) those
linked to non-health-specific activities such as structural adjustment,
critical investment, and private sector investment loans. The conclusion of
a study on these lending practices indicated that a major portion of the
World Bank pharmaceutical planned lending (eighty-two percent) was
directed toward pharmaceutical procurement. 22 The remaining eighteen
percent of Bank-planned lending in pharmaceutical projects included
financing civil works and equipment, training of professionals, and
technical assistance.
The World Bank has historically been reluctant to finance recurring
expenditures. "2 This position has been expressed most clearly in the case of
pharmaceutical lending, as the Bank has restricted the financing of
pharmaceutical procurement to the following situations: (1) as a method
to control specific diseases; (2) as an integral part of a national drug policy;
or (3) as part of a cost recovery or other drug financing program. 4 The
apparent contradiction between the Bank position and the results found in
the above-mentioned study might be explained by the insufficiency of
health care budgets, the demanding requirements of all-too-frequent
humanitarian emergencies, and the preference of borrowers to spend
money on tangible goods rather than in hiring consultants to provide
policy advice.
A more recent study found that the total amount of procurement for
pharmaceuticals and medical products (PMP) from fiscal years 1999 to
21. EDUARDO SABATE ET. AL., FINANCIAL AND POLIcYAUDIT OF THE WORLD BANK'S
PHARMACEUTICALS LENDING: BACKGROUND STUDY FOR WORLD BANK PHARMACEUTICALS
DISCUSSION PAPER 1 (World Bank Human Development Network, Sept. 2000).
22. RAMESH GOVINDARAJ ET. AL., WORLD BANK PHARMACEUTICALS PAPER 6 (2000).
23. See DENIS BROUN, PROCUREMENT OF PHARMACEUTICALS IN WORLD BANK PROJECTS 4
(HRO Working Papers Report No. 13525, 1994).
24. Id at 4-10.
407
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2002 under Bank loans was $401 million (approximately $133 million per
year, on average) .2 According to rough estimates, pharmaceutical sales for
Latin America, Asia and Pacific, Middle East, and Africa amounted to
thirty-nine billion dollars in 2001. 6 The relative magnitude of the
purchases funded from Bank loans (0.3%) is unlikely to have a substantial
impact on the performance of the markets. Furthermore, if non-
pharmaceutical PMP could be excluded from the computed figures, the
share of pharmaceuticals might come down substantially.
For the Bank as a whole, procurement of PMP amounts to 4.3% of the
procurement of all goods and to 1.4% of all procurement categories.
Restricting our analysis to the HNP sector, the share of PMP procurement
of all procurement categories rises to 17.7%.
The Effects of World Bank Lending on Competition in Pharmaceutical Markets
The World Bank is not directly involved in the production,
procurement or purchasing of pharmaceuticals, nor does it have any
regulatory capacity. It can nevertheless influence market behavior and
pricing in an indirect way. The Bank requires national procurement
agencies to apply competitive procurement procedures, such as
international competitive bidding (ICB), when using loan proceeds.8 The
Bank thus promotes a process-akin to generic competition-that should
lead to lower, more competitive prices.29 While this approach is powerless
25. ROSA RODRIGUEZ-MONGUIO &JUAN RovIRA, AN ANALYSIS OF PHARMACEUTICAL LENDING
BY THE WORLD BANK 11-13 (HNP Discussion Paper 2004), available at
http://wwwl.worldbank.org/hnp/hsd/documents/AnAnalysisofPharmaceuticalLending.p
df.
26. GLAXOSMITHKLINE, ANNUAL REPORT 45 (2002).
27. RODRIGUEZ-MONGUIO & ROVIRA, supra note 25, at 13. Note that sixty-six percent of
the total procurement of PMP corresponds to the South Asian region. Id.
28. See infra Annex 1; THE WORLD BANK, HIV/AIDS MEDICINES AND RELATED SUPPLIES:
CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT AND PROCUREMENT (2004), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROCUREMENT/Resources/Technical-Guide-
Procure-HIV-AIDS-Meds.pdf.
29. See Patricia M. Danzon & Michael F. Furukava, Prices and Availability of
Pharmaceuticals: Evidence from Nine Countries, W3 HEALTH AFF. 521 (2003) (comparing
average price levels for drugs in eight countries); see also ANNA COOK, How INCREASED
COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (Congressional Budget Office 1998) (examining the impact of
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when products are patent-protected or enjoy other legal forms of marketS 30
exclusivity, as is often the case with pharmaceuticals, it is expected to
facilitate competition in the presence of product differentiation, moral
hazard, and other market failures and imperfections.
However, a recent study cast some doubts on the extent to which the
Bank's procurement requirements-even when unobstructed by legal
hurdles-effectively promote international competition. The study found
that a large share of the Bank's lending for PMP during the period of FY
1999 to FY 2002 financed either the domestic pharmaceutical industry of
the borrower countries or the procurement of supplies from international
organizations. Nearly twenty-nine percent of the total value of loans
supplied by the Bank went toward PMP provided by suppliers from the
same country that had received the Bank's loan. ICB was the
procurement method for ninety percent of the contracts with the same
supplier and borrower country. In the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Cameroon, China, Indonesia, Macedonia, and Nicaragua, all PMP
purchased were supplied by a national supplier irrespective of the
procurement method used. 2 From a total of fifty Bank borrower countries,
twenty-two suppliers accounted for ninety-nine percent of the total PMP
purchased from IFY 1999 to FY 2002." International organizations such as
UNICEF and the Pan American Health Organization were also key
To respond to concerns raised with regard to the quality of the medicines subject to
open-bidding procedures, the Bank requires procurement agencies to assess the quality of
the manufacturers and products using prequalification of suppliers and other strategies. In
the case of ARV and other HIV-AIDS drugs, the World Bank supports the initiative on
prequalification of manufacturers and products led by the World Health Organization. See,
e.g., Helen Frankish, WHO Steps Up Campaign on Counterfeit Drugs, 362 THE LANCET 1730
(2003).
30. In those cases where the TRIPS Agreement offers countries some safeguards,
parallel importation, the issuance of compulsory licenses, or the implementation of
government use of a patent might be considered.
31. RODRIGUEZ-MONGUIO & RoviRA, supra note 25, at 12.
32. Other countries also have a large percentage of the total procurement of PMP
supplied by domestic manufacturers: Burundi (63.5%), Egypt (87%), Mexico (86.3%),
Morocco (67.7%), Philippines (59.5%), and Kenya (75.9%). Id.
33. The Indian pharmaceutical industry was the main foreign supplier of
pharmaceuticals and medical products: The Indian industry supplies 15.7% and 14.3% of
the total PMP purchased by the twenty-two main Bank borrowers and by all fifty borrower
countries, respectively. In spite of this apparently strong exporting capacity, Indian
pharmaceutical products went mainly for domestic consumption, accounting for 89.1% of
the country's total PMP. Id.
409
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suppliers, jointly accounting for 44.8% of the total supply. 4
III. A NEW WORLD BANK POSITION ON GENERICS AND IPR
Bank lending for pharmaceuticals was traditionally used for the
procurement of essential drugs and vaccines that are mostly off-patent.
Since Bank projects have usually targeted basic health needs of poor
populations, the Bank argued that these could be addressed with relatively
old, well-established medicines. Since 1993, when the first Standard
Bidding Procedures (SBP) for pharmaceuticals were issued, requirements
were set to use international non-proprietary names (INN) for product
specification. In recent years, and especially in the context of the "scaling-
up" of HIV/AIDS treatment programs in developing countries, purchasers
of drugs have been faced with the high cost of using some on-patent drugs,
especially antiretrovirals (ARVs), which have had dramatic impacts on the
survival and quality of life of people living with HIV/AIDS. Many countries
could not afford the high prices of on-patent drugs. The entry into the
market of generic versions of ARVs, mainly produced by Indian
manufacturers, opened the opportunity for countries to dramatically
reduce the costs of AIDS treatment, in turn making it possible for
countries to treat a much larger number of individuals with their available
budgets.
In the early 2000s, the Bank did not have an explicit and consistent
practice with regard to the procurement of generic versions of ARVs that
were on-patent in most developed countries. Uncertainties on the part of
both the Bank and country ministers regarding the implications of TRIPS
for developing countries sometimes resulted in countries choosing
originator products aimed at ensuring conformity with a country's
3,domestic legislation and with international agreements. "
Two recent documents have clarified the Bank position on this matter.
In March 2003, two top World Bank managers published an op-ed in The
New York Times openly endorsing the option of developing countries
34. Id.
35. SMITH, supra note 6, at 6.
36. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT FOR PROPOSED LOANS IN
THE AMOUNT OF US$25.0 MILLION TO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND US $15.15 MILLION TO
BARBADOS IN SUPPORT OF THE FIRST PHASE OF THE US$155.0 MILLION MULTI-COUNTRY
HIV/AIDS PREVENTION AND CONTROL ADAPTABLE PROGRAM LENDING (APL) FOR THE
CARIBBEAN REGION, 13 (Paper No. 22184-LAC 2001).
IV:2 (2004)
10
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buying generic drugs whenever possible.37 More recently, the World Bank
published a Technical Guide to offer guidance to improve the
performance of the agencies involved in the procurement of HIV/AIDS
products. 8 In the Guide's chapter on IPRs, the Bank offers explicit
guidance to developing countries on how to use the flexibilities of the
TRIPS and of their own legislation in order to obtain the lowest possible
prices while ensuring a standard quality of the supply of pharmaceuticals
and other medical products. The publication of the Technical Guide was
welcomed by some NGOs and activist organizations.39
The impact of the Bank's position on the global market appears
limited by the relatively modest amount of its own pharmaceutical lending.
However, it might have a strong demonstration effect on countries and on
other institutions, such as the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria,
based on the prestige and leverage that the Bank has on economic and
policy issues in the international arena. The strategies and procedures
initially applied in the field of HIV/AIDS products may be extended later
to other therapeutic areas, where IPR-related high prices may constrain the
affordability of essential drugs, especially among the poor in developing
countries.
37. Ramphele & Stern, supra note 11, at A19.
38. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 28.
39. See, e.g., Posting of Brook Baker, B.Baker@neu.edu, to IP-Health@cptech.org (Feb.
26, 2004), http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2004-February/005987.html;
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ANNEX 1: PROCUREMENT METHODS RECOMMENDED BY THE WORLD BANK
According to the World Bank's procurement guidelines, ° it is one of
the Bank's roles to review the procurement process and to ensure that it is
performed in accordance with the procedures established in these
guidelines.
In each particular case, the procurement method and the category of
goods are agreed upon by the Bank and the borrower and are specified in
the loan agreement.
The procurement guidelines offer the following methods:
1. International competitive bidding (ICB) is generally required for
all individual procurements valued at US$200,000 or more. This
value is different from region to region and even within regions
there are differences among countries "although exceptions can
be made in appropriate circumstances.
4 1
2. National competitive bidding (NCB) is applicable in those cases
where there is not enough foreign competition. National
Competitive Bidding (NCB) is the competitive bidding procedure
normally used for public procurement in the country of the
borrower. NCB may be the preferred method of procurement
where foreign bidders are not expected to be interested because:
(a) the contract values are small, (b) works are scattered
geographically or spread over time, (c) works are labor intensive
or (d) the goods or works are available locally at prices below the
international market.
42
3. Limited international bidding (LIB), which is essentially an ICB
conducted by invitation to the suppliers or contractors to
participate, is to be applied when there is only a limited number of
potential suppliers. Limited International Bidding (LIB) is
essentially ICB by direct invitation without open advertisement. It
may be an appropriate method of procurement when (a) the
contract values are small, (b) there are only a limited number of
suppliers, or (c) other exceptional reasons may justify departure
40. See THE WORLD BANK, STANDARD BIDDING DOCUMENT PROCUREMENT OF HEALTH
SECTOR GOODS (2000).
41. Id. at 106.
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from full ICB procedures.'
4. Shopping (International, ISH or National, NSH) is a procurement
method based on comparing price quotations obtained from
several suppliers, usually not less than three, and is an appropriate
method for procuring readily available off the shelf goods or
standard specification commodities that have a small value.
a. International shopping (ISH) generally implies soliciting
bids from at least three suppliers in at least two different
countries and is usually restricted to procuring small
volumes of goods.
b. National shopping (NSH) from local supplier may be used
where the desired goods are ordinarily available from more
than one source in the country of the borrower at
competitive prices.
5. Direct contracting (DIR) can be utilized when goods can be
obtained just from one supplier. DIR without competition may be
an appropriate procurement method when (a) an existing
contract for goods or works may be extended for additional goods
or works of a similar nature, (b) standardization of equipment or
spare parts, to be compatible with existing equipment, may justify
additional purchases from the original supplier, (c) the required
equipment is proprietary and obtainable only from one source,
(d) the contractor responsible for a process design requires the
purchase of critical items from a particular supplier as a condition
of a performance guarantee, or (e) in exceptional cases such as in
response to natural disasters.45
6. Procurement may be made from United Nations's sources or
other agencies, applicable for a total amount of procurement up
to USD$5 million for U.N. agencies and USD$ 250,000 for
NGOs.46
43. Id. at 23.
44. Id. at 21.
45. Id. at iv.
46. Id. at vi.
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